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Coughlin et al.: Coughlin: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:
THE UNIFORM
ARBITRATION ACT,
I. INTRODUCTION
This annual Article2 has been prepared since 1983 as a survey of recent
developments in the case law interpreting and analyzing various versions of the
Uniform Arbitration Act (U.A.A.).

3

Currently, thirty-four states and the District

of Columbia have adopted arbitration statutes patterned after the U.A.N 4 The
purpose of this analysis is to promote uniformity in interpreting the U.A.A. by

explaining the underlying policies and rationales that have developed from recent

court decisions.'

II.

SECTION 1: VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

Section 1 of the U.A.A. provides that:
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any
controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable

and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract. 6

This project was written and prepared by Journal of Dispute Resolution Members and
1.
Candidates under the direction of Associate Editor in Chief Brian R. Hajicek and Note and Comment
Editor Kevin L Fritz.
2. See Recent Developments: The Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1992 J. DLSP. RESOL 411; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL 417; Recent Developments: The
Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1990 J. DIsP. RESOL 471; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration
Act, 1989 J. DISP. RESOL 237; Recent Developments: The Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1988 J. DISP.
RESOL 247; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1987 Mo. J. DIsP. REsOL 177;
Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1986 Mo. J. DsP. RESOL 169; Recent
Developments: The Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1985 Mo. J. DImP. RESOL 173; Recent Developments:
The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1984 Mo. J. DISP. RESOL 207; Recent Developments: The Uniform
Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L REv. 137 (1983).
3. UmI. ARBITRATION AcT §§ 1-25, 7 U.LA. 5 (1985) [hereinafter U.A.A.].
4.
Jurisdictions which have adopted such statutes are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
5.
This Article surveys cases decided between September 1991 and September 1992.
6. U.A.A. § 1.
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Courts promote a policy of settling disputes through arbitration by resolving in
favor of arbitration, where doubts arise over whether private agreements mandate
the process.7 The language in Section 1 of the U.A.A. firmly provides the basis
upon which courts grant deference to the validity of arbitration agreements.'
A. Intent to Arbitrate

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.
Communications Workers of America9 acknowledged

"a presumption of

arbitrability" when dealing with interpretation of arbitration clauses."0 Recent
lower court interpretations of Section 1 and AT&T Technologies follow this
presumption.
Generally, courts go to great lengths to find a valid arbitration agreement."
In Health Employees Labor Program of Metropolitan Chicago v. County of

Cook,'2 an appellate court reversed a trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff
union's motion to compel arbitration involving two union employees discharged
by defendant.' 3 The union sought arbitration pursuant to its collective bargaining
agreement with defendant. 4 The judicial panel noted that the Illinois Public

Labor Relations Act'" mandated that arbitration apply to all employees of a
collective bargaining unit.' 6 The court also noted that the Act provides that any
agreement produced under it shall prevail over any other law or regulation. 7
Thus, the court found that arbitration was not to be dismissed and must be
compelled.' 8
Courts also find valid agreements to arbitrate by reconciling various
provisions within a single contract. In Johnston County, North Carolinav. R.N.

Rouse & Co.,9 the Supreme Court of North Carolina, after reconciling two
provisions in a contract between a county and a construction contractor, held that
the arbitration provision therein would be enforceable. 20 The issue in Johnston
County was whether the arbitration clause was reconcilable with another contract

7. Ronbeck Constr. Co. v. Savanna Club Corp., 592 So. 2d 344, 346 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1992);
see also Johnston County, N.C. v. RN. Rouse & Co., 414 S.E.2d 30, 32 (N.C. 1992).
8. U.A.A. § 1.
9.
475 U.S. 643 (1986).
10. Id at 650.
11.
See infra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
12.
603 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct 1992).
13. Id at 591.
14. Id. at 591-92.
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1600-1627 (1985).
16. Health Employees, 603 N.E.2d at 593 (the union in this case is such a collective bargaining
unit).
17. Id
18. Id.
19.
414 S.E.2d 30 (N.C. 1992).
20. Id at 31.
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clause. 2' The contract clause merely provided that the contractor waived any
right to challenge jurisdiction by a North Carolina court. 2
The North Carolina Supreme Court found that the court of appeals'
interpretation of the waiver clause as a forum selection device was erroneous and
that it in no way contravened the agreement to arbitrate.2 In reaching its
decision, the court applied the contract law principle requiring provisions in a
24
contract to be reconciled unless not reasonably possible.
Courts look at the validity of contracts to arbitrate by applying different
standards in different situations.

In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Cetus Corp.,2S the

Court of Chancery in Delaware considered the applicable standard for a
preliminary injunction pending resolution of a California arbitration hearing. 26
Kodak, the plaintiff, urged that if the underlying claims are arbitrable, the court
should grant the injunction and not pass on the merits of the claims, or, in the
alternative, only determine that the claims are not frivolous. 27 The Chancery
Court decided to address plaintiff's entitlement to arbitration of the merits.2" The
to arbitration is clear, the court's inquiry
court stated that where the entitlement
29
into the merits should be limited.
The court found that although Kodak could survive a scrutiny of success on
the merits, it showed no irreparable harm.30 Thus, the injunction was denied.3'
scrutiny on the merits
Significantly, the court noted that the claim only passed
32
because of the presence of plaintiff's right to arbitrate.
Similarly, in Jefferson County School District No. R-1 v. Shorey,33 the

Supreme Court addressed the standard of review to be applied in a motion to
compel arbitration.3 4 The majority3 held that in ruling on the arbitrability of
a dispute, the court must not look at the merits of the claim. 6 In disputes which
are subject to arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements, the
determination of the merits of the case are for the arbitrator alone. 7

21.

Id.

22.

Id at 34. The waiver clause provided that "the Contractor [Rouse] agrees to submit itself

to the jurisdiction of the courts of North Carolina." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. No. CIV.A. 12,249, 1991 WL 255936 (Del. Ch. Dec. 3, 1991).
26. Id.at*l.
27. Id.at *4.
28. Id.at *5.
29. Id.
30. Id.at *5-6.
31.
Id.
32. Id.at *5.
33.
826 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1992).
34. Id.at 840.
35. Id.at 846; Justice Vollack dissented on other grounds. Id.at 846-50.
36. Id.at 838.
37. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

3

400

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1993, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 10
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
[Vol. 1993, No. 2

Although courts are likely to find a valid arbitration agreement, there are
instances where they have failed to find one. In Shearson, Lehman, Hutton, Inc.
v. Lifshutz, 3' a split panel decided that the appellant securities brokers could not
compel arbitration where they could produce no evidence that the appellee
investors entered into a written agreement to arbitrate.3 The majority found that
the brokers had the burden of establishing that a written agreement to arbitrate
existed between the parties.4" The court held that the production of a standard
arbitration agreement, along with other brokerage agreements, did not satisfy this
burden, and thus, denial of the motion was proper." Judge Anstead dissented,
reasoning that the brokers' evidence, as the only evidence received, was sufficient
to find a valid agreement.42
1. Right to Open Courts
In Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen,43 the court compared jury waiver
provisions in loan and security agreements to arbitration contracts which waive all
parties' access to the court system." In this case, personal guarantors for a
corporate debtor demanded a jury trial for a lender's action against the
guarantors.45 The court held that the jury waiver provisions in the contracts
between the lender and guarantors were enforceable even though those agreements
were contracts of adhesion.46
The court further held that rights waived by arbitration clauses were
considerably more comprehensive than the right to a jury trial. 4 Finally, the
court found that both an agreement to arbitrate and a jury trial waiver clause may
be set aside on the basis of fraud or overreaching.48 Neither was claimed in this
case. 49 The holding in Chase is significant because it illustrates the importance
of arbitration clauses in effecting individual rights. The case also affirms the
policy of enforcing those clauses in most cases.
A major move away from the judicial trend favoring arbitration is displayed
in Nebraska v. Nebraska Ass 'n of Correctional Employees.50 This case involves
a state decision that the right of open access to the courts, as described in

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

595 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 997.
Id
Id
Id at 998.
588 N.E.2d 705 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
Id at 708.
Id at 706-07.
Id at 709.
Id at 708 (citing D.IL Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972)).
Id
Id
477 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. 1991).
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Chase,"'is too valuable to be waived by a prior contract. In Nebraska Ass'n, the
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the state's adoption of Section 1 of the U.A.A.
violated the Nebraska Constitution.52 The court held that authorizing binding
arbitration of all future disputes, per the U.A.A., went against the open courts
provision of the Nebraska Constitution."
Nebraska's Constitution provides that all injured persons "shall have a remedy
by due course of law. 5 4 In reaching its decision, the NebraskaAss'n court cited
numerous Nebraska cases which voided arbitration clauses in insurance
contracts." In one such case, German-American Insurance Co. v. Etherton,"
the court reasoned that a binding
arbitration clause improperly ousts the courts of
57
their legitimate jurisdiction.
The court in NebraskaAss'n then cited a line of cases following the lead of
German-AmericanInsurance.58 Significantly, in HartfordFireInsurance Co. v.
Hon,59 the court reasoned that enforcement of a valid and subsisting cause of
action is a substantial right; the citizen cannot be held to have bartered that right
away before a controversy arises.6 The Nebraska Ass'n court also noted a
case6 which expressed a fear that allowing this constitutional right to be
contracted away would open a floodgate for other constitutional guaranties to
potentially be taken away.62 NebraskaAss 'n is indicative of Nebraska's historical
and continued hostility to arbitration as violative of a guaranteed right to open
courts.

2. Common Law Arbitration
The extent to which courts will go to find a valid agreement to arbitrate is
found in Massey v. Galvan.63 In this case, the court found that a verbal
agreement existed and stated that it must look to the common law since the
agreement was not in writing, and therefore, not subject to the Texas General
Arbitration Act.'
The court supported its finding that a valid arbitration

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See supra note 43.
Nebraska Ass'n, 477 N.W.2d at 581.
NEB. CONST. art 1, § 13.
Id.
Nebraska Ass'n, 477 N.W.2d at 581.
41 N.W. 406 (Neb. 1889).
Id
Nebraska Ass'n, 477 N.W.2d at 582.
92 N.W. 746 (Neb. 1902).
Nebraska Ass', 477 N.W.2d at 582 (citing Hanford Fire, 92 N.W. at 747).
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 92 N.W. 736 (Neb. 1902).
Id at 737.
822 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Ct App. 1992).
Id. at 315-16; TEX REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (West Supp. 1988).
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agreement existed by citing Texas favoritism towards arbitration and the common
law of contracts.65
In contrast to the Massey holding, the Minnesota Supreme Court used
common law analysis and refused to enforce a verbal agreement to arbitrate in
Anderson v. FederatedMutual Insurance Co.' The court in this case affirmed
the appellate court decision that the agreement was unenforceable. 6 However,
the court found erroneous the lower court's line of reasoning that the enactment
of the U.A.A. in Minnesota superseded the common law with respect to the oral
agreement." The court further stated that the common law rule making oral
contracts revocable until the parties actually submit to arbitration precludes the
validity of the contract in this case. 69 The Massey and Anderson courts thus
illustrate that the common law still applies where agreements to arbitrate do not
conform to the U.A.A., most notably with oral contracts.
B. Scope of the Agreement
Courts show a clearpreference for arbitration when determining which issues
an arbitration agreement covers. Courts tend to find all issues arising between
parties to an arbitration agreement to be encompassed by the agreement unless
excluded by the agreement's express language.7 °
In Ronbeck ConstructionCo. v. Savanna Club Corp.,7 the court dealt with
an arbitration clause in a construction contract involving a dispute between a
general contractor and a property owner.7" The owner sued the contractor for
rescission of both the original contract containing the arbitration clause and a
subsequent contract which the owner alleged was procured by misrepresentation
of the contractor.73 The owner also sought damages for breach of contract, fraud,
conversion, civil theft, and conspiracy.74
The contractor filed a motion with the circuit court to compel arbitration of
these claims based on the original contract between the parties.75 The court twice
denied the motion and the contractor appealed.76 The court of appeals reversed,

holding that the broad language of the arbitration clause "plainly" covered all of
the owner's claims.77 The court also found that the policy of both the Florida

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Massey, 822 S.W.2d at 316.
481 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. 1992).
Id at 49.
Id.
Id at 50.
See infra notes 71-119 and accompanying text.
592 So. 2d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also supra note 7.
Ronbeck, 592 So. 2d at 345.
Id. at 345-46.

74.

Id.

75.
76.
77.

Id. at 346.
Id.
Id. at 346-47.
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and federal courts was to resolve all doubts involving the scope of such clauses
in favor of arbitration.78
The court stated that the claims relating to the second contract were also
arbitrable because of the first contract's arbitration clause. 9 The court focused
on the first agreement which provided for arbitration of any claim arising from the
"breach" of the first contract.80 This held true for the claim of rescission of the
first contract as well.8 The court held that unless the rescission claim involved
fraudulent inducement, it was subject to arbitration.' The court also found that
the civil theft claim was arbitrable even though its basis was a criminal
violation.u
Similarly, the court in Island on Lake Travis, Ltd. v. Hayman Co.
Contractors,Inc.84 applied contract theory to find a valid arbitration agreement
between the parties.8 5 In Island,the court considered the appeal by a builder of
a retirement center concerning the district court's confimnation of an arbitration
award for the builder's contractor.8 6 The court held that there is a strong
presumption favoring arbitration in Texas and that any doubt concerning the scope
of issues to be submitted to arbitration should be resolved in favor of
arbitrationY
The builder claimed that because the contractor assigned its contract to a
second contractor, TJH Company, which did the actual construction, all disputes
between the builder and TJH were not subject to arbitration.8 The court noted
the broad language of the contract and found that such a dispute "concerning the
ownership of a claim arising from the contract is just as arbitrable as a dispute.
'
Thus, disputes concerning which party holds a cause
. . of the claim itself."89
of action based on a contract are within the scope of arbitration under Texas'
version of the U.A.A. 90
In Gordon Sel- Way, Inc. v. Spence Brothers, Inc.," the Michigan Supreme
Court held that interest payments properly fell within the scope of issues that an
arbitrator can consider in making an award. The court stated that an award will
be presumed to be within the arbitrator's authority unless there is an express

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 346.
Id. at 347.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
834 S.W.2d 529 (rex. Ct. App. 1992), order vacated,848 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1993) (judgment

set aside to facilitate entry of settlement agreement).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.at535.
Id.at 530.
Id. at 532-33.
Id. at532.
Id. (emphasis added).
See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 224-238 (West 1973 & Supp. 1992).
475 N.W.2d 704 (Mich. 1991).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

7

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1993, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 10
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 1993, No. 2

Based on this principle and the broad language of the parties'
prohibition.'
arbitration clause, the court found that the93lower court had improperly deleted the
interest amount of the arbitrators' award.
One issue not often included within the scope of arbitrable issues is the
95
subject of attorney's fees.94 Pierce v. J. W. Charles-Bush Securities,Inc. held
that where the parties had agreed during arbitration to submit the issue of
attorney's fees to the arbitrators, such an award was enforceable despite the
arbitrators being precluded by the Florida U.A.A. from issuing attorney's fees in
the absence of an agreement.96 Pierceinvolved a civil action by certain investors
for fraud, negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against two
97
stockbrokers arising from the investors' account with defendant stockbrokers.
During a court ordered arbitration pursuant to this action, both parties
98
stipulated that the arbitrators would also determine any award of attorney's fees.
99
The court, following a liberal reading of the Florida U.A.A., stated that the
0
parties may make a binding agreement to arbitrate attorney's fees. l" This
illustrates the liberal reading that some courts give to U.A.A. statutes in order to
01
include as many issues within the scope of arbitration agreements as possible.'
Section 1 of the U.A.A. also plays an important role in insurance contracts.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court in
Mutual Reinsurance Bureau v. Great Plains Mutual Insurance Co.'°2 and held
that Kansas state law precluded enforcement of an arbitration clause in an
The Kansas statute in question'" provided that
insurance contract. 3
arbitration clauses in insurance contracts are invalid.'0 5 The District Court had
held that the Federal Arbitration Act (F.A.A.) 0 6 mandated that the arbitration
clause between the insurer and reinsurer was enforceable. 0 7 The Court of

92. Id. at 710.
Id.
93.
94. See Pierce v. J.W. Charles-Bush Sec., 603 So. 2d 625, 628-29 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1992).
603 So. 2d 625.
95.
96. Id. at 629; see FLA. STAT. ch. 682.11 (1991), providing in pertinent part, "unless otherwise
provided.., expenses and fees, not including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration
shall be paid as provided in the award."
97. Pierce, 603 So. 2d at 626.
Id.
98.
FL. STAT. ch. 682.11 (1991).
99.
100. Pierce, 603 So. 2d at 629.
See supra notes 63-94 and accompanying text.
101.
969 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 614 (1992); see also Recent
102.
Developments: The Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1992 1 DISP. RESOL 411, 415-16, for a discussion of
the lower court's decision in Mutual Reins. Bureau v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 750 F. Supp. 455
(D. Kan. 1990).
103. Mutual Reins., 969 F.2d at 931-32.
104. KAN STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1991).
105. Mutual Reins., 969 F.2d at 932.
106. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
107. Mutual Reins., 969 F.2d at 932.
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Appeals disagreed and found that the McCarran-Ferguson Act'08 precluded
application of the F.A.A. to this particular reinsurance agreement. Specifically,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act left "the business of insurance" to the states'
legislatures." ° The Court of Appeals decided that the Kansas statute was such
a law regulating "the business of insurance."" ° Therefore, Kansas' version of
the U.A.A. controlled and the agreement was unenforceable.'
The Kansas Supreme Court reached a contrary result in Skewes v. Shearson
Lehman Bros.12 Here, the underlying claim sounded in tort, and the parties'
contract was not insurance related." 3 The majority held that the F.A.A.
preempts conflicting state laws which exempt courts from enforcing arbitration
agreements involving interstate commerce." 4 The Kansas version of the
U.A.A." 5 prohibited the arbitration of tort claims." 6 A key difference
between Skewes and Mutual Reinsurance was that in Mutual Reinsurance,the
McCarran-Ferguson Act exempted the F.A.A. from the insurance contracts." 7
In Skewes, the F.A.A. applied and preempted the state bar to arbitration."'
The dissent in Skewes argued public policy and stated that the plaintiff did
not contract to arbitrate tort claims with his employer when he contracted to
arbitrate disputes that arose from the sale of stock." 9 The prevailing view,
however, is that all issues not expressly excluded in the agreement are to be
arbitrated.
C. Statute of Limitations
Another issue that arises in arbitration is whether a statute of limitations has
precluded a specific claim from being arbitrated. In Estate of Vernon v. Shearson
Lehman Bros. Inc.,I20 the court held that a state statute of limitations can act to
bar arbitration of claims which would otherwise be compelled to arbitration by the
F.A.A.' 2' Here, securities brokers made claims against a deceased investor's
estate after the Florida statute of limitations 22 for such claims had run."2 The

108.
109.
110.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
Id. § 1012(b).
Mutual Reins., 969 F.2d at 932.

111.

Id. at 935.

112.

829 P.2d 874 (Kan. 1992).

113.

Id. at 875.

114.
115.

Id. at 876-77.
KAN. STAT. ANN § 5-401 (1991).

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Skewes, 829 P.2d at 875.
Mutual Reins., supra note 102, at 931.
Id
Id at 884.
587 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1991).

121.
122.

Id at 1170; see supra note 106 for the F.A.A. citation.
FiA STAT. ANN. § 733.702 (West 1989).

123.

Vernon, 587 So. 2d at 1170.
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brokers claimed that the arbitration clause in the parties' contract required the
court to compel arbitration pursuant to the F.A.A.'24
The court, however, found that otherwise binding arbitration agreements can
be barred by such statutes.' 25 Just because parties contract to arbitrate certain
disputes does not mean that the statutes of limitation are thus inapplicable.' 26
The court also held that arbitrators were not to decide whether a statute's time had
12 7

run.

In Rowry v. University of Michigan,2 ' the court was asked to resolve
another statute of limitations question.'29 In that case, the court determined
which of two statutes of limitations was applicable to a bus driver's action to
The driver had been
enforce an arbitration award against the university. 3
discharged by the university for negligent driving and subsequently filed a
grievance under his collective bargaining agreement.' 3' The grie.vance resulted
award in his favor, ordering the university to reinstate him as a
in an arbitration
32
bus driver.'
The university refused his request for reinstatement based on his
"unwillingness to cooperate in providing the [ulniversity with necessary medical
The driver filed for judicial
information on his medical condition."' 33
enforcement of the award just over ten months after the arbitrator's decision was
made.134
The issue in Rowry was whether Michigan's six-month statute of limitations
from the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA)' 35 barred the driver's
enforcement of the award.' 36 In Rowry, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled
a 1987 decision 37 which had borrowed the PERA statute because it considered
the six-year statute of limitations for contracts 138 unduly long for arbitration
enforcement. 39 The Rowry court found that the language of the PERA statute
prevented its application to the case at hand, and that, being contractual in nature,
the breach of the arbitration agreement fell under the six-year statute of limitations

124.
arbitration.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
(Mich. Ct
138.
139.

Id. The court also noted that Florida's version of the U.A.A. would normally compel
Id
Id.
Id
Id.
490 N.W.2d 305 (Mich. 1992).
Id.
Id at 305-06.
Id at 306.
Id.
Id.
Id
MIC-tCoMI. LAWS § 17.455(16)(a) (1987).
Rowry, 490 N.W.2d at 307.
See Walkerville Educ. Ass'n v. Walkerville Rural Communities Sch., 418 N.W.2d 459
App. 1987).
Micii- CoMP. LAWS § 600.5807(8) (1987).
Rowry, 490 N.W.2d at 307.
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for contracts.14 ° This is yet another example of a court using contract theory to
find a valid arbitration agreement.
In Cooper v. Celente,'4 ' investor plaintiffs brought securities claims against
defendant broker and his defunct firm. 42 Plaintiffs subsequently contracted with
defendant to submit claims to arbitration,' 43 Plaintiffs were unsatisfied with the
award of $5000 filed against defendant in a Delaware trial court. 44 The court
held that the Securities Division of Delaware had filed charges against defendant
before defendant's arbitration hearing with plaintiffs had taken place. 45 The
defendant was 1fined
and disciplined by the Securities Commissioner as a result of
46
these charges.
The court granted defendant's sununaryjudgement motion becausethe statute
of limitations for plaintiffs' statutory claims had run and because res judicata
barred those and the common law claims as well. 47 After the court determined
that the statute of limitations had run, the court held that resjudicatabarred all
the claims because the arbitrator's decision on them was final." s The court
reasoned that the language of the parties' agreement showed a clear intent to fully
adjudicate their dispute and that such an adjudication had occurred. 1 49 Although
statutes of limitation and the doctrine of res judicata are important in making
arbitration awards final in some cases, they can result in arbitration being barred
in others.

Ill. SECTION 2: PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY
ARBITRATION

A. Arbitratingthe Entire Dispute
Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, once an arbitration clause has been
50
executed, all of the disputes inclusive in that agreement must be arbitrated.
In A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Robertson, 5 ' an Illinois Appellate Court
used this principle
to reverse the trial court's decision and to instead compel
152
arbitration.

140.

Id at 308.

141.
142.

No. CIV.A. 90C-JL-215, 1992 WL 240419 (Del. Super. C. Sept 3, 1992).
Id. at *1-2.

143.

Id. at *2.

144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id at *3.
Id.

147.
148.

Id.
Id. at *5.

149.
150.
151.

Id.
U.A.A. § 2.
603 N.E.2d. 709 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992).

152.

Id.
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The debate in Staley focused on an employee who, through Staley, had both
a pension plan and a contractual agreement. 1 " The contract contained a
provision providing that if a dispute arose between employer and employee, the
disputed issue would be submitted to arbitration.'54 When the employee was
terminated from his job, there was a dispute as to the amount of benefits the
employee was entitled to under his pension plan.'55 The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's decision to stay arbitration of the issue, finding that
although the arbitration provision was not specifically mentioned in the pension
plan, the pension plan was part of the contractual agreement and was, therefore,
subject to arbitration under the contract provision.' 56
Subsequently, a dispute arose concerning the employer's payment of
attorney's fees for the above disagreement. 5 7 The claim for attorney's fees
arose out of this same pension plan.'5" Employee, however, did not want to
arbitrate this particular claim.'59 The Illinois Appellate Court, using precedent
set by its own Supreme Court, compelled arbitration of the claim for attorney's
fees as well. 6 ° The Minois Supreme Court case relied on by the appellate court
stated that "if the dispute clearly falls within the scope of the arbitration
agreement, the court should order arbitration."'' Here, it was already decided
that the pension plan agreement was part of the contractual agreement, and thus,
disputes arising from this matter must be arbitrated. The appellate court held that
"[o]nce a contract containing a valid arbitration clause has been executed, the
parties to the agreement are irrevocably committed to arbitrate all disputes under
the contract."' 16 2 Thus, the appellate court was correct to compel arbitration on
both debated issues.
Similarly, in Heiden v. Galva Foundry Co., 63 the Illinois Appellate Court
held that an entire dispute must be arbitrated even if the original circumstances are
altered." 4 In Heiden, plaintiff sold his interest in Galva Foundry Company to
defendant. 65 The transaction set forth that disputes arising between these parties
would be submitted for arbitration to the firm of Deloitte, Haskins & Sells." 6

153. Id at 710.
154. Id.
155. Id
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id at 711.
159. Id
160. Id
161. Id. (quoting Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Futures, Inc. v. Barr, 530 N.E.2d 439, 443 (i1.
App. Ct. 1988)).
162. Id. (emphasis added by court) (quoting Johnson v. Baumgardt, 576 N.E.2d 515, 520 (III.
App. Ct. 1991)).
163. 584 N.E.2d 518 (111.App. Ct. 1991).
164. Id
165.

Id at 519.

166.

Id

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1993/iss2/10

12

1993]

Coughlin et al.: Coughlin: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
UNIFORMARB1TRATION ACT

Subsequently,
this accounting firm merged with Touche Ross, another accounting
167
firm.
When Galva moved to compel arbitration, Heiden objected, claiming that
because the specific arbitrators agreed upon no longer existed, he was no longer
obligated to arbitrate.'" However, contrary to Heiden's objection, the court
stated that "[iut would elevate form over substance and would be contrary to the
overall purpose and goals of arbitration to hold that an agreement to arbitrate is
inoperative because the national accounting firm which the parties chose merged
with another national accounting firn. " ' 69
Thus, the court held that the arbitration act was not to be interpreted in a
rigid manner.171 In this case, it was clear that the parties originally intended to
arbitrate their disputes, thus seeking a fast resolution of their differences. 17 ' The
court stated that, generally, once a contract with a valid arbitration clause is
executed, the disputes contained172therein are compelled to arbitration, even if the
panel itself physically changes.
B. Scope of the Court's Findings
After arbitration is compelled by judicial supervision, a court's jurisdiction
is limited to specific matters. This limited jurisdiction has been the dispute of
many recent cases.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals resolved this question in Henderson v.
Hennan"' In this case, the plaintiff filed suit against defendant corporations
alleging breach of contract, unfair trade practices, and slander. 174 Defendants
counterclaimed and subsequently moved to compel arbitration and to stay
Henderson's pending case. 75 Defendant's motions were granted by Judge Henry
Hight Jr.176 One year later, plaintiff filed a motion with Judge Orlando F.
Hudson to lift the stay. 77 This motion was granted by Judge Hudson. 78
The Court of Appeals held that Judge Hudson was without authority to lift
the stay that Judge Hight granted on the plaintiff's case."7 9 It further stated that
although the Uniform Arbitration Act "requires that certain disputes be removed
from direct judicial supervision, the court that compels arbitration does not lose

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175,
176.
177.
178.
179.

rd
Id
Id at 521.
Id.
Id
Id
409 S.E.2d 739 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 740.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id.
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jurisdiction. '" Judge Hight did not lose jurisdiction, and further, did not have
to remain uninvolved during arbitration because the Act provides for minimal
judicial intervention during arbitration. However, the original judge retains the
jurisdiction necessary to enforce the arbitration award.''
Similarly, the Texas Appellate Court agreed with the North Carolina court
that, although the trial court does not lose its jurisdiction, such jurisdiction is
limited during the actual arbitration proceedings. In Transwestern Pipeline Co. v.
Blackburn,'" Mewbourne Oil sought a writ of mandamus compelling a relator,
Transwestern Pipeline Company, to vacate an arbitration requirement and to
instead allow discovery and proceed with trial." 3 The trial court denied this
A
writ because the contract between the two parties called for arbitration."
three-member panel for arbitration was then chosen. 5
Instead of seeking a discovery order from this panel, Mewbourne Oil
requested, and was granted, the order for discovery from the 84th District Court
of Ochiltree County.8 6 The district court ruled that such discovery was to be
conducted in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules of Texas."s
On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the district court exceeded
its jurisdiction by granting the discovery motion; the discovery order was therefore
In so holding, the appellate court stated that "once arbitration is
invalid."
[instituted], . . .jurisdiction [of the trial court] is limited to enforcement of
awards....

.i19

One issue that lower courts have jurisdiction over is deciding whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists. Such decisions are not appealable by right, but are
interlocutory.' 90 For example, in Patton v. Hanover Insurance Co.,' 9' the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania reached the above conclusion even though all the
issues of the case were not, and would not, be decided if the dispute was resolved
by arbitration.' 92
In Patton, appellee was crossing a street when she was struck by an
The uninsured vehicle then hit a car insured by J. C.
uninsured motorist. '

Id.at 741.
180.
181. Id. In Adams v. Nelsen, 329 S.E.2d 322 (N.C. 1985), the North Carolina Supreme Court
explained that a difference does exist between a court exercising existing jurisdiction and a court that
lacks jurisdiction completely. Nothing in the language of the Uniform Arbitration Act indicated that
a court loses its jurisdiction when a party submits a matter to arbitration. Id at 324 n.3.
182. 831 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Ct App. 1992).
183. Id.at 73.
184. Id.
185. Id
186. Id.
187. Id. at 74.
188. Id at 75.
189. Id.
190.
Patton v. Hanover Ins. Co., 612 A.2d 517 (Pa. Super. Ct 1992).
191.
612 A.2d 517.
192. Id at 519.
193. Id at 518.
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Penney Insurance Company. 94 Appellee was not covered by any insurance. 95
However, she demanded that J. C. Penney Insurance Company settle the case or
submit it to arbitration according to its own insurance policy provisions."9 J.
C. Penney Insurance Company objected, claiming it need not arbitrate this claim
with appellee because she was not a "covered person" under their policy
contract. 7 The J. C. Penney Insurance Company argued that if the claim went
to arbitration, it would never be decided whether appellee was covered by this
policy; therefore, J. C. Penney Insurance Company would potentially have to pay
the claims of a noninsured person.'
The trial court dismissed this objection
and compelled arbitration.'"
The Superior Court held that the trial court has jurisdiction to determine if
arbitration should proceed." ° Although unhappy with the outcome, J. C. Penney
Insurance Company was not allowed to appeal this decision. The court stated that
compelling arbitration does not finalize the dispute, but merely submits it to
another stage.2"' The court held that "[slince the order in question merely
directed the parties to proceed to arbitration and did not end the litigation, the
order is interlocutory and not appealable by right. "2°" The court concluded that
only final orders are appealable." 3
C. Waiver
When a party denies the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by waiving

its rights to such alternative dispute resolution, motions to compel arbitration
cannot be maintained." 4 A recent case interpreting Section 2 of the Uniform
Arbitration Act confirms this. In Samuel J. Marranca GeneralContracting Co.
v. Amerimar,0 5 contractor sued owner, the defendant, on a construction
contract.2" 6 When a dispute arose regarding payment for work, Amerimar did
not file a petition to compel arbitration. 2' 7 Nor did Amerimar raise the issue of

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.at 519.
199. Id.
200. Id.This conclusion is consistent with the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN., §§ 7304, 7314(aXl)(v) (1982).
201.
Patton, 612 A.2d at 518.
202. Id.The North Carolina Court of Appeals supported this argument in Lee County Board
of Educ. v. Adams Elec. Inc., 415 S.E.2d 576, 577 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). In Lee County, the court
held that an order is final and therefore appealable if it determines the action, discontinues the action,
or grants or refuses a new trial Id.
203. Patton, 612 A.2d at 518.
204. U.A.A. § 2.
205.
610 A.2d 499 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
206. Id. at 500.
207. Id. at 501.
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arbitration as an affirmative defense either in preliminary objections or in a new
Instead, Amerimar waited to hear the results of its pretrial
matter.20 8
motions.20 9

Upon receiving adverse rulings on these motions, Amerimar sought to enforce

a provision in the contract that provided for arbitration of subsequent disputes. 1 0
Prior to claiming this arbitration clause was mandatory, Amerimar had been ready
dispute; it had filed actions in other jurisdictions upon the contract
to litigate the
21
in question. '
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that Amerimar could not take
actions to litigate and then inconsistently claim the arbitration clause was
mandatory. 21 2 According to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Section
1030, the defense of arbitration is an affirmative defense; 213 if it is not plead in
a new matter, it is waived. 1 4
Although there was no express waiver in this case, arbitration cannot be
compelled when there is an implied waiver. 15 The court stated that "[w]aiver
may be established by a party's... undisputed acts or language so inconsistent
with a purpose to stand on the contract provisions as to leave no opportunity for
a reasonable inference to the contrary." 21 6 The court stated that Amerimar
waived its right of arbitration by its conduct.217

IV. SECTION 3: APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS BY
COURT
Section 3 of the U.A.A. provides that where an arbitrator is unable to
perform, or where the method for appointing one is frustrated in any manner, the
court "on application of a party shall appoint one or more arbitrators."21M Case
law under this section has been very sparse this past year.
In Heiden v. Galva Foundry Co.,219 referred to previously in this update,
the Illinois Court of Appeals held that where the specifically designated arbitrator
was an accounting firm which had merged into another firm, the parties were still
obligated to arbitrate. 22 0 Although Illinois' version of the U.A.A. 22' calls for

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id
Id
Id. at 500-01.
Id. at 501.
Id
Id
Id

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id
Id
Id
U.A.A. § 3.
584 N.E.2d 518 (IL App. Ct 1991).
Id at 521.
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termination of arbitration agreements if the method of appointing arbitrators is
frustrated,222 the court declined to "elevate form over substance" and compelled
arbitration despite the formality concerning the original arbitrators' names.22

V. SECTION 5: HEARING
Section 5 of the U.A.A. provides for the procedural aspects of an arbitration
hearing.224 Subsection B gives parties the right to 'be heard, to present evidence
material to5 the controversy, and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the
22

hearing.

In Alperin v. Eastern Smelting and Refining Corp.,226 the court interpreted
Subsection B. In this case, an auditor's price adjustments were not considered to
have the effect of an arbitration where plaintiff stock seller was given no
opportunity to be heard or present his views on the prices of stock in dispute.22 7
Plaintiff in Alperin sued defendant buyer for the balance of the value of stock sold
to defendant, claiming that the auditor who determined the price deviated from the
contract formula.22 Defendant claimed that the auditor's determination should
be final, just as an arbitrator's decision is final.2 2 9 Plaintiff was simply informed
of the final price without a hearing or discussion on the manner.2 3° Thus,
plaintiff was not a party to any arbitration. 3

VI. SECTION 7: WITNESSES, SUBPOENAS, AND
DEPOSITIONS
Section 7 of the U.A.A. provides arbitrators the power to order subpoenas,
production of documents, and depositions. 23 2 In Transwestern Pipeline Co. v.
Blackburn,23 appellant Transwestem sought a writ of mandamus to vacate
respondent judge's order in aid of discovery in an arbitration proceeding. 234 The
appellate court granted the writ, holding that the lower court's discovery order was

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 101-123 (1989).
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 103, para. 3 (1989).
Heiden, 584 N.E.2d at 521.
See U.A.A. § 5.
U.A.A. § 5(b).
591 N.E.2d 1122 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
Id. at 1127.
Id at 1124.
Id.
Id a 1127.
Id.
U.A.A. § 7.
831 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 73-74.
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beyond its powers once arbitration had commenced.235 The court addressed the
issue of what "commencement" of proceedings means, finding that the arbitration
first
process begins once the first arbitrator is selected.236 In this case, the
2 37
arbitrator was chosen before the order in dispute was issued by the court.
VII. SECTION 11: CONFIRMATION AND VACATION OF
AWARDS

A. Statutory Requirements
According to Section 11 of the U.A.A., for a court to confirm an arbitration
award, the award must comply with the specific statutory requirements of that
particular state." s A number of recent cases have interpreted Section 11 of the
Uniform Arbitration Act. For example, failure to rigidly comply with the
Pennsylvania arbitration statute led to an invalid award in Jacksonv. Government
Employees Insurance Co."9 The relevant statute in this case stated a general
rule: "The award of arbitrators shall be in writing and signed by the arbitrators
joining in the award .. .. 240 In Jackson, the court cited two problems that
occur when only one of the arbitrators signs the award. 241 First, the award
simply does not meet the requirements set out in the statutory language.242
Second, the award is invalid because it only shows one vote in favor of the award,
and therefore, lacks majority support.243 An award signed in such a fashion was
held null and void.244

24
Similarly, the Appellate Court of Minnesota in Stassen v. Tschida 1
required not only the signature of all arbitrators as in Jackson, but also required
that all awards:

shall contain the name of the parties, a summary of the issues in
controversy, the damages and other relief requested, the damages and
other relief awarded, a statement of any other issues resolved, the names
of the arbitrators, the date the claim was filed and the award rendered,

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 78.
Id. at 77-78.
Id.
See U.A.A. § 11.
612 A.2d 1071, 1073 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
No. C2-91-2070, 1992 WL 67536 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1992) (unpublished decision).
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the number and dates of hearing sessions,46 the location of hearing
sessions, [and] the location of the hearings.
In this case, appellant claimed that the arbitration award granted was invalid
because it failed to determine the parties' fault percentages.247 The court held
that such a request for fault percentages must be made orally because it does not
fall under the statutory248requirements; because appellant did not so request, his
argument lacked merit.
B. Bias and Fraud
Just as arbitration statutes must be rigidly complied with to be valid, the
proceedings must
also be free from any bias, fraud, or other corruption in order
to be upheld. 249 In Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 2 ° the Illinois
Appellate Court addressed procedural misconduct and bias. In Bruder, plaintiff
was injured in a car accident involving two uninsured motorists. The defendant
insurance company denied the plaintiff's claim and the dispute was sent to
arbitration. 25 ' Defendant selected Mr. James Bleyer as his choice of arbitrators
to serve on the panel.252 Defendant had been a valued client of Mr. Bleyers for
the past twenty-five years.2" 3 Additionally, Mr. Bleyers was currently retained
by defendant on separate business matters. 1 4 Plaintiff chose attorney John
Womick for the panel. 255 Mr. Womick had handled numerous cases against the
2 6
defendant and his insureds.
These two attorneys then chose a neutral party
25 7
to complete the panel.
The arbitration panel decided the dispute in favor of defendant, and
subsequently, the trial court held that the panel was not biased in its decision.25
On appeal, plaintiff claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
an attorney with a relationship with defendant to serve on the arbitration
panel. 9 The appellate court declared that there were no requirements as to who
may serve as an arbitrator.2" The court stated that naturally each party would

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id at *2.
Id.
Id at *3.
U.A.A. § 11.
596 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. App. Ct 1992).
Id at 876-77.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 880.
Id at 880-81.
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designate someone to the panel who is sympathetic to that party's cause.26 This
anticipated practice is the reason for the third, neutral panel member.262 The
court also held that plaintiff's claim was unsupported because vacating an award
due to bias on part of the arbitrators usually concerns the neutral party. 63
Where bias of the arbitration panel is at issue, the award granted will still not
be vacatedunless suchbias is "definite, direct, and capableof demonstration rather
than remote, uncertain, or speculative. "2' The trial court in Bruder considered
the totality of the situation and held that there was no such bias.265 The trial
court did, however, conclude that such a past relationship as existed here between
defendant and his chosen arbitrator may be considered when looking for bias.2 6
The court stated that the relationship itself, however, is not per se invalid and the
determined award is not automatically vacated.267
C. PrejudicialEffect
Even if free from both fraud and bias, an arbitration panel's decision may not
be upheld if the decision would result in unfair prejudice to one of the parties.
The Supreme Court of Alaska held that a trial court may exclude part of an
arbitration panel's findings of fact if the prejudicial effect of those findings
outweighs their probative value.2"
In Municipality of Anchorage (MOA) v. Frank Coluccio Construction
Company (FCCC), 269 a dispute arose concerning the amount of money to be paid
under a contract provision for construction of a tunnel site.270 In the contract,
the parties agreed to arbitrate numerous issues and also agreed that, with respect
to liability issues, the arbitration decision would be both binding and
nonappealable. 2" Another clause of the contract provided that 1VCCC would be
entitled to more money than originally agreed upon if, while tunneling, they
encountered differing land site conditions than those originally expected.27 2

When a dispute arose, the parties submitted it to

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
1992).
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

arb~itration 2"

Id at 881.
See id at 880-81.
Id at 881.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Municipality of Anchorage v. Frank Coluccio Constr. Co., 826 P.2d 316, 324 (Alaska
826 P.2d 316.
Id at 318. ,
Id at 319.
Id at 318.
Id at 319.
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After hearing the claims, the arbitration panel concluded that FCCC did
encounter differing site conditions during its construction.274 However, the panel
been prepared for such site
stated that FCCC, with their experience, should have
2
conditions and should have mitigated the damages. "
The parties moved to the trial court for confirmation of the panel's
MOA sought to have both the Findings and the Award
decision.276
confrmned. 77 FCCC asked only for confirmation of the Award in order to avoid
raising any conclusions concerning their negligence.2 7 8 The trial court agreed
with FCCC and did not confirm the Findings of the panel. 279
The question before the panel was simply whether there was a breach of
contract.280 The arbitrators had only to decide this "yes or no" question. The
panel decided "Yes", MOA was liable because it breached the contract.2 8' Even
though the panel chose to continue its analysis and answer the question "Yes..
but," the trial court was not required to consider the further analysis.'
The trial court held that allowing the Findings portion of the arbitration to
be presented "would lead the jury to confusion, would be misleading, and would
be unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiff."m The court stated that when certain
information will prejudice a jury's findings, the trial court has discretion to
determine if the evidence will be admitted into evidence. 2'

VIII. SECTION 10: FEES AND EXPENSES OF ARBITRATION
A. Arbitrator'sJurisdiction
When a dispute is submitted to arbitration, the chosen panel resolves
numerous issues. As the following two cases indicate, the structure of the
arbitration agreement itself often determines the jurisdiction of the panel's
decisions.
In Fridman v. Citicorp Real Estate Inc.,' the issue of an arbitration
hearing was the entitlement of a senior mortgagee to attorney's fees. The
arbitration panel awarded attorney fees to the senior mortgagee, including fees for

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id at 320. •
Id
Id
Id at 320-21.
Id at 321.
Id.
Id at 322.
Id.
Id.
Id at 321.
Id. at 324.
596 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1992).
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time spent during the arbitration proceeding actually determining attorney's
fees.2"6 The Florida Second District Court of Appeals held that the arbitrators
overstepped their subject matter jurisdiction by awarding fees incurred in
conducting arbitration.2" The court stated that it is the job of the circuit court,
not the arbitrators, to determine such fees. 288 The court further stated that most
arbitrators are business people chosen for their expertise and knowledge of the
disputed subject matter. 9 Generally, arbitrators are not experienced in
determining reasonable attorney's fees. 2' Even though the arbitration panel in
Fridman consisted of three attorneys who were experienced in determining fees,
the court held that this exception, though reasonable, would still not be
allowed.291
Five months later, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals stated that if
the parties themselves specifically agree to submit the fee issue to an arbitration
panel, the clause can be valid and enforceable. In Pierce v. Charles-Bush,29 the
parties stipulated on record that along with fraud, negligence, and breach of
contract claims, the arbitrators would determine the issue of entitlement to
attorney's fees. 293 Despite the stipulation, Bush argued that the arbitrators did
not have the authority to decide matters concerning attorney's fees.294
The court of appeals, however, after reviewing past decisions and its own
arbitration act, concluded that the policy favors arbitration. 295 The court found
that the fees awarded to attorneys are not designed to benefit the attorney', but are
instead meant to indemnify the parties. 29 6 The court further stated that there is
no reason not to enforce an agreement regarding attorney's fees if that is what the
contracting parties agreed oil 29 The court stated that by agreeing to arbitrate,
the parties are favoring a fast and less expensive resolution of their dispute.298
Further, when parties specifically agree to submit the fee issue to arbitration, the
decision by the arbitrators will be enforced. 2"

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id at 1129.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id
Id
603 So. 2d 625 (Fla. Dist CL App. 1992).
Id. at 626.
Id at 627.
Id
Id at 630.
Id at 626.
Id at 630.
Id. at 631.
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IX. SECTION 14: JUDGMENT OR DECREE ON AWARD

After an arbitrator's ruling has been confirmed, modified, or corrected,
U.A.A. Section 14 provides for a judgment to be entered and enforced just like
the court to award costs in
any other judgment.3 r° Section 14 also allows
30'
award.
the
enforcing
and
entering
to
addition
In Delaney Electric Co. v. Schiessle,3°c an electrical contractor filed a
mechanic's lien claim which subsequently went to arbitration.0 3 After the
arbitrator awarded the contractor damages, the trial court declined to confirm the
arbitrator's ruling regarding the validity of the mechanic's lien.3' However,
upon deciding not to confirm the award, the trial court granted summary judgment
on the basis of the award.3 °5 The award stated only that "Schiessle shall pay to
3 6 and "[t]he claim of
Delaney Electric Company the sum of ...$13,269.00,0'
Michael Schiessle against Delaney Electric Company is denied in its entirety. '""3°
The trial court failed to hear evidence as to whether the requirements for a
valid lien claim were met before entering summary judgment.3"° The appellate
court questioned the power of the trial court to enter summary judgment for the
contractor after declining to confirm the arbitration award. 3 9 The appellate
court concluded that the trial court could not enter summary judgment based solely
on an unconfirmed arbitration award without hearing evidence on the motion for
summary judgment.3 ' Therefore, the appellate court reversed, stating "we
cannot pennit the circuit court to accomplish indirectly that which it acknowledged
it could not do directly."31'
In Kliefoth v. Fields,312 a defendant in a securities lawsuit fied for
bankruptcy and received protection from the automatic stay. 1 3 The bankruptcy
court granted partial relief from the stay to allow the securities dispute to be

300. U.A.A. Section 14 provides:
"Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, judgment
or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other judgment
or decree. Costs of the application and of the proceedings subsequent thereto, and
disbursements may be awarded by the court"

U.A.A § 14.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id
601 N.E.2d 978 (ill. App. Ct 1992).
Id. at 981.
Id at 984.
Id.
Id. (quoting from the court's opinion, which is quoting from the arbitration award).
Id
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
828 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. Ct App. 1992).
Id.
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arbitrated." 4 After the arbitration proceeding, the trial court entered judgment
on the award." 5 The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court was not
authorized to enter judgment on an arbitration award where partial relief from 3an
16
automatic stay in bankruptcy specifically allowed only arbitration proceedings.
The court concluded that the statutory procedure set out in U.A.A. Section 14
distinguishes an arbitration award from a judgment rendered on that award by a
Since the relief from the stay only allowed issuance of the
court of law.3"
arbitration award, the trial court was enjoined from entering a judgment and the
judgment entered was void.31 8
The issue of court-awarded costs under Section 14 pursuant to arbitration was
addressed in Wachtel v. Shoney 's, Inc.319 In this case, minority shareholders
sued to confirm an arbitration award against Shoney's, the majority shareholder
in the corporation. 3 " The trial court confirmed the award and granted attorney's
fees and expenses to plaintiffs.32' The appellate court held that awarding
attorney's fees and expenses in confirming an arbitration award was within the
discretion of the trial court3 22 The appellate court also stated that the trial court
a follow up hearing to award attorney's fees and expenses for the
could conduct
32 3
appeal.

X. SECTION 15: JUDGMENT ROLL, DOCKETING
U.A.A. Section 15 contains two provisions. 324 First, the judgment roll
should consist of: (1) the arbitration agreement; (2) the arbitration award; (3) the
order confirming, modifying, or correcting the award; and (4) a copy of the

314.

Id.

315.

Id. at 715.

316.

Id. at 716.

317.

Id

See also Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.400 (1986),

318. Kliefortlh 828 S.W.2d at 716.
319. 830 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. CL App. 1992).
320. Id at 906.
321. Id.
322. Id at 910.
323. id.
324. U.A.A. Section 15 provides:
(a) On entry of judgment or decree, the clerk shall prepare the judgment roll consisting,
to the extent filed, of the following:
(I) The agreement and each written extension of the time within which to make the
award;
(2) The award;
(3) A copy of the order confining, modifying or correcting the award; and
(4) A copy of the judgment or decree.

U.A.A

(b) The judgment or decree may be docketed as if rendered in an action.
§ 15.
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judgment or decree. 325 Second, the judgment or decree can be docketed.
No cases interpreting U.A.A. Section 15 were decided during the time frame of
this update.

XI. SECTION 16: APPLICATIONS TO COURT
U.A.A. Section 16 provides for applications to the court by motion and
guarantees that the motions will be heard in the same manner as any other motion
before the court. 27 In Concord General Mutual Insurance Co. v. Northern
Assurance Co. ,328 the parties were insurance companies who submitted a dispute
over an auto accident to an arbitration panel pursuant to a special arbitration
agreement of the insurance industry.329 Concord then applied to have the
arbitration award vacated.330 The trial court refused to hear oral testimony on
Concord's motion to vacate. 3 Concord appealed, claiming it should have been
given an opportunity to argue its motion in a testimonial hearing. 32 On appeal,
Concord argued that the trial court abused its discretion because in denying a
hearing, the court had deprived Concord of its statutory right of review.33
The appellate court concluded that the trial court had discretion to receive

evidence by affidavit, deposition, or oral testimony.3 34 The court stated that "a
party is not entitled to a testimonial hearing on a motion to vacate or confmn an
arbitration award in the absence of a showing that such a hearing will disclose
relevant facts not otherwise before the court in affidavit form." 33 5 Consequently,

the court held that when Concord failed to demonstrate the need for a testimonial
hearing, the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate without a hearing did not
infringe on Concord's rights and did not amount to an abuse of discretion.336

325. Id.
326. Id.
327. U.A.A. Section 16 provides:
Except as otherwise provided, an application to the court under this act shall be by motion
and shall be heard in the manner and upon the notice provided by law or rule of court for
the making and hearing of motions. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, notice of
an initial application for an order shall be served in the manner provided by law for the
service of a summons in an action.
U.A.A. § 16.
328. 603 A.2d 470 (Me. 1992).
329. Id at 471.
330. Id.
Id.
331.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 472.
334. Id
Id
335.
336. Id
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XII. SECTION 17: JURISDICTION
U.A.A. Section 17 provides for jurisdiction over arbitration in any court of

competent jurisdiction.33 7 The forming of an arbitration agreement between the
parties confers jurisdiction on338the court to enforce the agreement and to enter
judgment based on the award.
In Modern Health Care Services, Inc. v. Puglisi,339 the parties entered an

agreement for Modem to purchase the medical practice and goodwill of
Puglisi. 340 After a few years under the agreement, Puglisi filed a demand for
arbitration to determine if the agreement had been terminated.341 While the
arbitration proceeding was pending, Modem filed suit in circuit court seeking an
injunction for the return of some files Puglisi removed.34 2 The trial court
granted the injunction and ordered Modem to continue making monthly payments
pursuant to the agreement.343 Subsequently, the parties disagreed as to the
payments ordered by the trial court.344 Puglisi filed a motion for contempt and
the trial court granted the motion ordering Modem to continue making
payments.345 Modem appealed the order of the trial court, claiming the
trial
346
court lacked jurisdiction to force Modem to continue making payments.
At the time of the court order, the meaning of the agreement was the central
issue in arbitration.34

The appellate court stated that the institution of the

arbitration proceeding divested the trial court of jurisdiction on all issues except
the making of an agreement or provision.34 The appellate court held that the
trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the order, reasoning that the contract
issue was in front of the arbitrator before the order was entered and that the
arbitrator had full authority to grant relief.349
350
In Hydaburg Cooperative Ass'n v. Hydaburg Fisheries,
the Native

Alaskan Cooperative, after entering into an agreement to arbitrate, asserted

337. U.A.A. Section 17 provides:
The term 'court' means any court of competent jurisdiction of this State. The making of
an agreement described in Section 1 providing for arbitration in this State confers
jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agreement under this act and to enter judgment on
an award thereunder.

U.A.A. § 17.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Id
597 So. 2d 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 931.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
826 P.2d 751 (Alaska 1992).
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immunity from jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 5 1 The arbitration agreement between
the parties provided that any dispute be decided in accordance with Alaska
law. 352 Hydaburg Fisheries sued the Cooperative for breach of contract, and the
court ordered arbitration pursuant to the agreement.353 The arbitration panel
awarded Hydaburg Fisheries over $200,000 and the trial court confirmed. 354 The
Cooperative then appealed asserting lack of jurisdiction. 3'- The appellate court
stated that the agreement to arbitrate constituted a waiver of the tribe's sovereign
immunity regarding proceedings to compel arbitration or enforce arbitration
awards.356 Consequently, the court held that U.A.A. Section 17 granted
the state superior court to order arbitration and enter judgment on
jurisdiction35to
7
the award.
35
Finally, in Pierce v. J.W. Charles-Bush Securities, Inc. , 8 discussed
previously in this update, the parties agreed to submit the issue of attorney's fees
to arbitration.359 The court stated that the parties, by agreeing to arbitrate,
confer jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agreement pursuant to U.A.A.
Section 17. 3' The court further reasoned that if the parties confer jurisdiction,
361
In
they also have the power to decide what claims to submit to arbitration.
conclusion, the court held that U.A.A. Section 10362 prevents arbitrators from
awarding attorney's fees, but the effect of Section 10 may be changed by
agreement of the parties. 63

XIII. SECTION 19: APPEALS
Section 19 of the U.A.A. authorizes an appeal from an order of the court:
(1) denying an application to compel arbitration, (2) granting an application to stay
arbitration, (3) confirming or denying confirmation of an award, (4) modifying an

351. Id at 753.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 755.
357. Id.
358. 603 So. 2d 625 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1992).
359. Id. at 626-27. The parties stipulated during the course of arbitration that the issue of
attorney's fees was to be decided by the arbitrators. Id at 626.
360. Id. at 630.
361. Id. at 630-31.
362. U.A.A. Section 10 provides: "Unless otherwise provided in the agreementto arbitrate, the
arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counselfees, incurred in the
conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award."
U.A.A. § 10 (emphasis added).
363. Pierce, 603 So. 2d at 631.
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award, (5) vacating an award without directing a rehearing, or (6) of a judgment
of decree entered. 364

In Stahl v. McGenty,365 an appellate court dealt with the issue of when an
appeal should be granted on an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. 3
Here, the purchasers of a business brought suit against the seller for fraudulent
misrepresentations concerning past income of the business. 36' The defendant
3
filed a motion to compel arbitration which was denied by the trial court. 1
Defendant then proceeded to trial without appealing the court's denial of
arbitration. 369 After losing a jury verdict at trial, defendant attempted to appeal
the trial court's earlier denial of the motion.370 The appellate court stated that
the denial of a motion to compel arbitration should have been immediately
appealed,37' and thus, denied the appeal following final judgment. 2 The
court reasoned that the appellant waived his right to appeal the order by not
attempting to appeal immediately following the ruling of the trial court.3
In Capital Income Properties-LXXX v. Waldman,374 a group of limited
partners alleged fraud, and Capital moved to compel arbitration. 75 As in Stahl,
the trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration.37 6 However, unlike the
appellant in Stahl, Capital immediately filed an appeal. 37
The appellate court found the arbitration provision in the parties' agreement
not enforceable under the U.A.A. 378 The court further concluded that since the
arbitration provision was unenforceable, U.A.A. Section 19 did not authorize an

364. U.A.A. Section 19 provides:
(a) An appeal may be taken from:
(1) An order denying an application to compel arbitration made under Section 2;
(2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made under Section 2(b);
(3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) An order modifying or correcting an award;
(5) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this act.
(b) The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments
in a civil action.
U.A.A. § 19.
365.
486 N.W.2d 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
366. Id at 159.
367. Id. at 158.
368.
Id.
369.
Id.
370.
Id.
371.
Id. at 159.
372.
Id.
373.
Id.
374.

835 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Ct App. 1992).

375.

Id. at 153.

376.

Id.

377.

Id

378.

Id. at 155.
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interlocutory appeal. 3 9 The court held that because no interlocutory appeal was
provided by the U.A.A. or any other applicable statute, the appellate court could
only have jurisdiction over a final judgment. 3 °
In Lee County Board of Education v. Adams Electrical, Inc.,381 the
appellate court addressed the issue of an interlocutory appeal of a stay of
arbitration. 3 2 Here, the county board of education filed suit seeking to stay the
arbitration claims of an electrical workerM 3 The trial court enjoined the parties
from arbitrating prior to determining whether there was an enforceable arbitration
agreement. 3 " The court concluded that the order could not be appealed because
the order only maintained the status quo .3 The court held that interlocutory
appeals should be allowed only if the order or ruling: (1) determines the action,
action, (3) grants or refuses a new trial, or (4) prejudices a
(2) discontinues the
36
8
right.
substantial
A refusal to vacate an arbitration award is normally not appealable under
Section19. However, a Minnesota appellate court found otherwise in Independent
School District No. 88 v. School Service Employees Union Local 284.31 In this
case, a union of school service employees sued on behalf of five cooks at the
school. 3 ' The union's motion to compel arbitration was granted, and the
arbitrator awarded the employees reinstatement with back pay.' Thereafter, the
school district's motion to vacate the award was denied, and the district
appealed.39 The appellate court concluded that the order refusing to vacate was
the "functional equivalent" of an order confirming the award, which is appealable
under Section 19.391
However, in Carroll v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co.,3 a
Pennsylvania court found that an order confirming an award must be reduced to
judgment before the appeal is timely.

379.

Id.

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

Id.
415 S.E.2d 576 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
Id.at 576-78.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id.
490 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. CL App. 1992)
Id at 432.
Id. at 433.
Id.
Id. at 433 n.1.
616 A.2d 660 (Pa. Super. CL 1992).
Id. at 664.
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XIV. SECTION 12: VACATING AN AWARD
Case law, as it has developed, favors arbitration with a minimal amount of
court interference. Arbitrators are considered judges of both law and fact and are
not required to divulge their reasoning on the issue(s) decided. Generally, even
if the court thinks an arbitrator erred as to a matter of law or fact, the court will
not vacate an award absent a finding of some misconduct. Nor will the court
reverse an award that is unjust or inadequate. There are, of course, limited
situations where a court will vacate an award pursuant to a party's motion to
vacate. 94 Courts give deference to arbitrators' decisions to ensure an effective
and final means of dispute resolution.
A. Corruption,Fraud,or other Undue Means in Award
Formation
In order to establish fraud, the proponent has the burden of proving it with
clear and satisfactory evidence. 95 Courts strongly favor confirming arbitration
U.A.A. Section 12 provides:
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being

394.

shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so

conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice
substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined

in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing
without raising the objection; but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or
would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing
to confirm the award.
(b) An application under this Section shall be made within ninety days after delivery
of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon corruption, fraud
or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety days after such grounds are known
or should have been known.
(c) In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in clause (5) of Subsection (a)
the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the
agreement, or in the absence thereof, by the court in accordance with Section 3, or if the
award is vacated on grounds set forth in clauses (3) and (4) of Subsection (a) the court
may order a rehearing before the arbitrators who made the award or their successors
appointed in accordance with Section 3. The time within which the agreement requires
the award to be made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from the date of the

order.
(d) If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the
award is pending, the court shall confirm the award.

U.A.A. § 12.
395. Professional Builders, Inc. v. Sedan Floral, Inc., 819 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Kan. Ct. App.
1991).
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awards. 96 In ProfessionalBuilders, Inc., v. Sedan Floral,Inc.,3 the plaintiff
contracted to build an interior office for the defendant. The architect on the
project was also a fifty percent shareholder in the plaintiff corporation.398 It was
the architect's responsibility to certify when the project was complete, according
to his professional opinion.3" The dispute arose when the architect in this case
declared the project finished, a determination with which the defendant clearly
The defendant contended that they were denied a fair and
disagreed."
independent determination by the architect as to when the project was
completed. 4"'
This dispute was arbitrated in favor of the plaintiff.4
Thereafter, the defendant motioned to vacate the award on the grounds that it was
procured by fraud, corruption, or other undue means; the basis of this claim
centered on the architect's interest in the plaintiff's corporation.4" 3
The district court found that the defendant failed to establish its burden of
showing fraud, corruption, or other undue means.4° It held that in order to
overturn an arbitrator's decision based on fraud, "there must be proof of an
arbitrary disregard of undisputed evidence or some extrinsic consideration such as
bias, passion or prejudice."40 5 The appellate court in this case noted that a
motion to vacate for reasons of fraud is usually based on an allegation of fraud on
the part of the arbitrator.4" As a basis for a motion to vacate, the appellate
court held that courts will only consider fraud in the actual arbitration
proceeding. 4° The court found that defendant did not allege fraud on the part
of the arbitrator, but rather on a third party, which does not meet the fraud
requirement for a motion to vacate. 408 The appellate court affirmed the
"based on the limited scope of review of arbitration
arbitrator's award
4
proceedings. 11 o9
In Drinane v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,410 the plaintiff
attempted to vacate an arbitration award on grounds of undue means. 411 "Undue
means" refers to an unjust and unfair decision or decision-making process by the

396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

Id.
819 P.2d 1254.
Id at 1255.
Id at 1256.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id. at 1258.
Id (quoting Lostutter v. Estate of Larkin, 679 P.2d 181 (Kan. 1984)).
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.at 1259.
584 N.E.2d 410 (Il. App. CL 1991).
Id. at411.
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arbitrator.4" 2 This court determined that "undue means" should be construed as
meaning something along the lines of "fraud" or "corruption."4 '3 Drinane and
State Farm entered into arbitration over an uninsured motorists policy. The
arbitrator was an attorney who was simultaneously representing a client who was
involved in a pending action against State Farm.41 4 However, the arbitrator did
not disclose this information."' Drinane was not satisfied with the award they
action, and
received and contended that the arbitrator's involvement in the pending
416
the failure to disclose this information, constituted "undue means."
The court held that an order to vacate an award must be supported by "very
Substantial grounds.' 4 17 The moving party has the burden of showing that the
bias is "direct, definite, and capable of demonstration, rather than remote,
uncertain or speculative." 41 1 Courts are reluctant to set aside an arbitrator's
award simply on a failure to disclose a relationship with a party.419 This court
denied Drinane's motion to vacate because their assertion of undue means on the
part of the arbitrator was too remote and uncertain.420 Public policy dictates that
allowing disgruntled parties to assert bias on the part of the arbitrator, in an
attempt to vacate a disfavored award, should not be allowed.42'
B. ArbitratorPartiality,Misconduct, and Bias
A relationship between an arbitrator and a party can, however, support a
motion to vacate an award. In DonegalInsurance Co. v. Longo,4' a motion to
vacate was granted because the arbitrator in the proceeding was simultaneously
representing one of the parties in an unrelated matter.4 3 Under the arbitration
agreementbetweenDonegal Insurance (Donegal) and Shirley Longo (Longo), each
party was allowed to choose an arbitrator.42 4 The arbitrators chosen would then
select a third arbitrator.42 5 The Longos chose an attorney who was representing
them in another dispute.426 Subsequently, the arbitrators found for the
Longos."" After learning of this relationship, Donegal motioned to vacate the

412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

Id at 414.
Id
Id at 411.
Id
Id
Id at 413 (citing Giddens v. Board of Educ., 75 N.E.2d 286, 291 (IlL 1947)).
Id
Id
Id at 414.
Id. at 415.
610 A.2d 466 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
Id. at 467.
Id
Id
Id
Id
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award on the basis that they were denied a fair hearing due to the conflict of
interest on the part of one of the arbitrators. 4"
The court stated that in order for an arbitration proceeding to comport with
due process, the hearing must be conducted by arbitrators who are impartial and
disinterested.429 The court sustained the motion to vacate and held that the
attorney-client relationship between Longo and one of the arbitrators made it
unlikely that the arbitrator was able to render a fair decision.43
In Vascular and General SurgicalAssociates v. Loiterman,431 Dr. Loiterman
entered into an employment contract with the plaintiff, Vascular and General
The employment agreement
Surgical Associates [hereinafter VGSA].432
contained a covenant that Dr. Loiterman would not compete for two years

following the termination of his employment.433 When the contract lapsed, Dr.
Loiterman established a surgical practice that competed with VGSA. 434

In

response, VGSA received an injunction against Dr. Loiterman through an
arbitration proceeding. 4"

Dr. Loiterman, on appeal, sought to vacate the award claiming that the
arbitrator was impartial; 43 6 the attorney that acted as arbitrator had previously
represented one of the hospitals out of which VGSA worked.4 3 However, the
hospital was neither a party to the action, nor did it have a financial stake in the
outcome of the decision. 43 This court found that Dr. Loiterman failed to show
by clear and convincing evidence that the arbitrator was biased and denied his
motion to vacate the award.439
C. Exceeding the Scope of Authority
An award may be vacated when the party seeking the vacation shows by clear
and convincing evidence that the arbitrator exceeded his/her authority when
making the award. 44 ' Arbitrators receive their authority from two different

428. Id
429. Id at 468 (the court held that since Donegal did not learn of the arbitrator's relationship
with Longo until after the conclusion of the hearings, Donegal had not waived the right to object to
the composition of the arbitration panel).
430. Id; see also Woods v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. C3-91-1901,1992 WL 48042, at *2 (Minn.
App. Mar. 17, 1992) (the court found that "only the partiality of the neutral arbitrator constitutes
grounds for vacating an award"). Id.
431.
599 N.E.2d 1246 (IlL App. Ct. 1992).
432. Id at 1248.
433. Id
434. Id
435. Id at 1249.
436. Id at 1252.
437. Id at 1253.
438. Id
439. Id.
440. U.A.A. § 12; see also Einhom v. Valley Medical Specialists, P.C., 838 P.2d 1332, 1334
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
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sources."' One source is the contractual agreement, entered into by the parties,
that stipulates which disputes will be submitted to arbitration.442 The other3
source is the document containing the issue(s) that an arbitrator is to decide.4
If an arbitrator violates the terms of the agreement or decides an issue that is not
before him/her, the arbitrator is deemed to have exceeded his/her authority, and
the award will be vacated. 444
In Malekzadeh v. Wyshock,445 plaintiff and defendant formed a
partnership 446 in which the defendant was a general partner and the plaintiff was
a limited partner." 7 The plaintiff sought to have one defendant enjoined from
acting on behalf of the partnership because he suspected him of
mismanagement. 44' Also, the plaintiff requested that he be assigned the
defendant's management duties." 9 This dispute was arbitrated pursuant to a
provision in the partnership agreement. 4 0 The arbitrator issued an award which
maintained the defendant as a general partner, but directed that his duties be taken
over by an independent property manager. 45' The defendant motioned to vacate
the award on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded their authority.452
The court held that the arbitrators did not exceed the scope of their authority,
and the defendant's motion to vacate was denied. 453 The court stated that it was
unnecessary for arbitrators to explain their reasoning for granting particular
relief.454 It stated that the award will be deemed within the scope of the
arbitrator's authority as long as the underlying basis of the award can be inferred
from the facts of the case.455 In this case, hiring an outside manager was within
the scope of the arbitrator's authority.456 This court determined that delegating
duties to an outside agent was the only way to preserve the partnership due to the
animosity between the parties. 4" The court held that "the arbitrator may grant
any remedy or relief which the Arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the
scope of the agreement of the parties." 4 1 In addition, the court held that an

441.
442.
443.
444.
445.

Malekzadeh v. Wyshock, 611 A.2d 18, 21 (Del. Ch. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
611 A.2d 18 (DeL Ch. 1992).

446.

Id. at 19.

447.
448.
449.
450.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id at 20.

451.

Id

452.
453.
454.

Id
Id at 23.
Id at 22.

455.

Id

456.

Id

457.

Id.

458.

Id (quoting American Arbitration Association Rule 43).
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arbitrator's award will only be outside the scope of authority when it is clear that
the "essence" of the award bears no relation to the underlying agreement.459
In Department of Transportation v. Maine State Employees Ass 'n," the
dispute concerned an employee who was discharged by the Department of
Transportation.46' The first arbitrator that heard the dispute reinstated the
employee, but did not make a specific finding that the Department of
Transportation fired him without just cause. 62 The Superior Court reversed the
decision because the first arbitrator did not make a finding of just cause, and then
submitted the dispute to a second arbitrator.463
The trial court held that "[ajn arbitrator exceeds his authority if all fair and
reasonable minds would agree that the award was not possible under the...
agreement."46 When there is an ambiguity in an arbitrator's award, it should
4 65
This
be remanded to the arbitrator who wrote the opinion for clarification.
court concluded that the first arbitrator's award should not have been vacated; the
fact that the first arbitrator reinstated the employee implicitly showed that the first
6
Thus, the first
arbitrator found no just cause for the employee's dismissal."
4 67
authority.
arbitrator was found not to have exceededher
In InternationalAss'n of Firefighters,Local 1285 v. City of Las Vegas,'0
a fire investigator was caught using his firearm while off duty. 46 9 As a result,
the city of Las Vegas demoted him.470 The investigator maintained that this
action was a violation of the parties' collective bargaining agreement and
subsequently sought relief through arbitration. 47' The first appointed arbitrator
ruled in favor of Local 1285, the investigator's employer.472 A second arbitrator
473
appointed to hear the dispute decided in favor of the city of Las Vegas.
Local 1285 assertedthat the second arbitrator exceededhis authority, because
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the first arbitration award should render

459. Id; see also Slater v. Public Housing Agency of City of Saint Paul, No. Cl-91-746, 1991
WL 198487, at * I (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1991) (arbitrator had power to fashion an equitable remedy
by creating a new position for an employee that was wrongfully discharged. Since this was not
expressly precluded by the parties' submission of issues, the scope of the arbitrator's authority was not
exceeded). Id at *2.

460.
461.
462.
463.

610 A.2d 750 (Me. 1992).
Id. at 751.
Id
Id

464.

Id at 752.

465.
466.
467.
468.
469.

d. at 752 n.1.
Id. at 752.
Id at 753.
823 P.2d 877 (Nev. 1991).
Id. at 878.

470.
471.

Id
Id.

472.

Id.

473.

Id. at 878-79.
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the second invalid.474 The court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
should apply to arbitration decisions because arbitration awards must be final in
order to provide an incentive for parties to arbitrate their disputes.4 " Thus, the
court held that the second arbitrator was bound by the first arbitrator's decision
and that he exceeded his authority when rendering contrary relief.476
There is a presumption that arbitrators do not exceed their authority."
However, an arbitrator exceeds his/her power when an award is not contemplated
in the parties' agreement. As long as arbitrators' decisions fall within the purview
of the issues set 47
before
them, the courts give deference to their decisions, even if
8
contrary to law.
D. Postponing the ArbitrationHearing
A motion to vacate may be granted if the arbitrator refuses to postpone an
arbitration hearing when sufficient cause is shown. 479 Review of the arbitrator's
decision is limited to the arbitrator's records.'
The motion will be granted
only upon a showing that the arbitrator(s) abused their discretion in denying a
motion to postpone a hearing.48
In Lee v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,4 the appellant and the appellee
sought resolution of a dispute concerning the terms of a brokerage agreement.'
The matter was submitted to arbitration and a hearing was scheduled for July 9,
1990.' The appellees requested and received a continuance until September 24,
1990.' The appellees requested a second continuance due to the death of an
expert witness; the appellants objected.'
Thereafter, the American Arbitration
Association denied the continuance and rendered a decision in favor of the
appellants on September 24, 1990.4
The trial court reviewed the appellee's motion to vacate and admitted into
evidencetestimony concerning the death of the expert and reasons why a successor

474. Id at 880.
475. Id at 882.
476. Id
477. See Ure v. Wangler Constr. Co., Inc., 597 N.E.2d 759, 762 (ilL App. Ct. 1992).
478. Id; but cf FirefightersLocal 1285, 823 P.2d 882 n.5 ("fa]n arbitrator exceeds his arbitral
authority when he has 'manifestly disregarded the law'" (quoting American Postal Workers v. United
States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982))).
479. U.A.A. § 12(a)(4).
480.
Lee v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 594 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1992).
481. Id
482.
594 So. 2d 783.
483.
Id. at 784.
484. Id
485.
Id.
486.
Id
487. Id
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could not have been substituted before the second hearing. 4 s The testimony
went into substantially more detail than the appellee's request for the second

continuance had.' The appellate court found that it was error for the trial court
to admit testimony that had not been presented before the arbitrator.4 ' ° The
court stated that an arbitrator's decision to disallow a continuance of a hearing
should be confined to the record of the arbitration proceeding. 49' Since there
was no evidence of abuse of discretion or misconduct by the arbitrator, the motion
to vacate was reversed and denied.49
E. Procedural Disagreements
The issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists can be raised in a motion
to vacate an award. 493 The courts give deference to arbitrators' decisions
regarding procedural disputes over the arbitration proceeding.4 94 In City of
Mount Dora v. Central Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc.,4 9 the city of
Mount Dora (City) and the Central Florida Police Benevolent Association
(CFPBA) arbitrated a dispute over a collective bargaining agreement. 4" The
agreement stated that each party would choose an arbitrator within seven days
after a notice to arbitrate.49 If the parties could not agree, a list of seven
arbitrators would be obtained. Then, each party would have the opportunity to
cross out three names, with the last name remaining being the arbitrator.4ra
City and CFPBA could not agree on an arbitrator.4 9 City argued that
CFPBA did not comply with the agreementbecause it failed to adhere to the strict
seven-day deadline set forth in the agreement."° However, the arbitrator ruled
that the CFPBA sufficiently followed the agreement.5"' Thereafter, City moved
to vacate the award on this ground. 5°

488. Id at 784-85.
489. Id
490. Id; see also Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Northern Assurance Co., 603 A.2d 470 (Me.
1992) (a party is not entitled to a testimonial hearing on a motion to vacate or confirm an award unless
relevant facts will be disclosed). Id at 472.
491. Lee, 594 So. 2d at 785.
492. Id
493. See Patton v. Hanover Ins. Co., 612 A.2d 517, 519 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
494. City of Mount Dora v. Central Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 600 So. 2d 520, 521-22
(Fla. Dist Ct App. 1992).
495. 600 So. 2d 520.
496. Id.
497. Id at 521.
498. Id
499. Id
500. Id
501. Id
502. Id

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

37

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1993, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 10
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 1993, No. 2

The court found that the arbitrator did not exceed his procedural authority by
ruling on this issue.' It stated that it was within the realm of the arbitrator's
power to decide procedural issues and procedural arbitrability.'0 4 The court
concluded that in order to preserve the finality of arbitration decisiois, arbitrators
must be allowed to decide procedural questions, and therefore, it was improper to
vacate the arbitrator's award. °5
F Public Policy
A motion to vacate an arbitration award will be granted when the award is
found to be contrary to public policy." 6 This finding is made on an individual
examination of each case."°7 In Department of Central ManagementServices v.
American Federationof State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSC&E),s "
a parole officer was discharged because he knowingly made false statements to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development." ° The parole officer disputed
whether there was "just cause" for his removal, and the matter was submitted to
arbitration.Y0 The arbitrator did not find just cause in the removal and
reinstated the officer without back pay. 5" The trial court vacated the award on
the ground that it was against public policy." 2
The court held that an award that is against public policy is not
enforceable." The court found that public policy has been defined in the
Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions, but more importantly, each case must
be examined according to its own set of facts and circumstances to determine if
public policy has been violated." 4 AFSCME maintained that the reinstatement
of the parole officer would violate the integrity of the correctional system "5
This court relied on cases which held that the focus should be on the arbitrator's
award itself, and not a general concern of public policy." 6 The arbitrator's

503. Id
504. Id
505. Id at 522.
506. Department of Cent Management Servs. v. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun.
Employees (AFSCME), 584 N.E.2d 317, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
507. Id at 322.
508.
584 N.E.2d 317.
509. /d at 318.
510. Id.
511.
Id
512. Id
513. Id at 321.
514. Id at 322.
515. Id
516. Id See also Department of Transp. v. Maine State Employees Ass'n, Seiu Local 1989, 606
A.2d 775 (Me. 1992) (the court noted that when an award is against public policy, the public policy
violated must be affirmatively expressed or defined in a Maine statute). Id at 777.
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award was upheld because there was "no well-defined
or dominant policy
51 7
mandating the discharge of the parole officer.u
G. Timing
A party has ninety days to make a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an
award.51 8 The time period starts from delivery of the award to the applicant or
within ninety days after any fraud, corruption, or other undue means is
discovered.519 If a motion is made outside the ninety day time period,
confirmation of the award is mandatory. 20 A request made by a party for an
explanation of the arbitrator's
award does not qualify as a request to vacate,
52
modify, or correct an award. '

XV. SECTION 13: MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF

AWARD
An arbitration award may be modified or corrected by the court on one of
three grounds set forth in Section 13 of the Uniform Arbitration Act: 522 (1)
There was a miscalculation of figures or a mistake in the description of any person
or property mentioned in the award; (2) The award was granted on a matter not
submitted to the arbitrators; or (3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form."2

517. AFSCME, 584 N.E.2d at 323.
518. U.A.A. § 12; see supra note 394.
519. U.A.A. § 12(b); see supra note 394.
520. Hart v. Metzger, 834 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
521.
Birchtree Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Thomas, 821 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
(arbitrators are not required to give reasons for their decisions). Id
522. U.A.A. Section 13 provides:
(a) Upon application made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award to
the applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award where:
(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the
award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues
submitted; or
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
(b) If the application is granted, the court shall modify and correct the award so as to
effect its intent and shall confirm the award as so modified and corrected. Otherwise,
the court shall confirm the award as made.
(c) An application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative with
an application to vacate the award.
U.A.A. § 13.
523. Id
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Because arbitrators are the final judges of both the law and the facts, the courts
give deference to their decisions. 524
In Carlson v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,"' the arbitrators decided to

reduce the amount of the plaintiff's award under an uninsured motorist policy by
the amount the plaintiff received from the tortfeasor's insurance.5 26 The plaintiff
argued that the arbitrators made an erroneous conclusion of law because the
collateral source statute, which requires reduction of recovery, did not apply to
arbitration proceedings.5 27 However, the court found that the arbitrators were
not acting outside their authority in applying the collateral source statute to the
plaintiff's award.5 28 The trial court stated that it did not have the authority to
modify the award of the arbitrators, even if it disagreed with the outcome.529
the authority to modify an award
The court held further that a court does not have
30
on the basis of an arbitrator's error of law.
In Jackson v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,531 the court found that

it was improper to obtain the arbitrators' affidavit or deposition testimony in order
to impeach an award. 32 The court held that to modify or correct an award,5 3it3
must be "evident" from the arbitrator's opinion that the award is improper.
Further, the court held that the purpose of an arbitration proceeding is to provide
an expeditious resolution of disputes,534 and that this purpose would be thwarted
by "[aillowing challenges to the deliberation process [of arbitrators] ....
Arbitration would be transformed from a method of dispute resolution into another
'
As3a6 result, the plaintiff in Jackson was denied a request
pretrial formality." 535
to depose the arbitrators.
Arbitrators are not required to set forth the reasons underlying their
decision. 531 "[A]rbitrators are no more obligated to give reasons for an award
than is a jury expected to explain a verdict."5 When a party makes a request

524. Carlson v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., No. C4-91-2006, 1992 WL 31357, at * 1 (Minn.
CL App. Feb. 25, 1992).
525. No. C4-91-2006, 1992 WL 31357.
526. Id at*l.
527. Id.
528. Id
529. Id
530. Id See also Keyes Co. v. Gomez, 590 So. 2d 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
531. 612 A.2d 1071 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).

532. rd at 1074; see also Patriotic Order Sons of America Hall Ass'n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
157 A. 259 (Pa. 1931).
533.

Jackson, 612 A.2d at 1073 n.1. See U.A.A. § 13.

534.

Jackson, 612 A.2d at 1074.

535.
536.
537.
538.

Id
Id. at 1071, 1074.
Birchtree Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Thomas, 821 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
Id (citing Hamilton Metals, Inc. v. Blue Valley Metal Prod. Co., 763 S.W.2d 225, 227

(Mo. Ct App. 1988)).
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to obtain clarification or reasoning from the arbitrator(s),
it is not treated as a
5 39
motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award.
In Worldwide Insurance Group v. Klopp,"40 a provision in an insurance
policy stated that if an arbitrator's award exceeded a stated minimum amount,
either party was entitled to demand a trial de novo.541 The court found this
portion of the policy unconscionable and against public policy. 42 The provision
allowed a de novo review when the award was too high, but not when the award
was too lOW. 543 In effect, only the insurer would be dissatisfied with a high
award, thus providing an "escape hatch" for the insurer to avoid high arbitration
awards.'" The insured cannot appeal a low award.5 45 The court in Clinton
v. John Hancock Insurance Co.546 relied on the Klopp finding that such a
provision is unconscionable, and found that a claim of unconscionability did not
satisfy the grounds necessary to vacate, modify, or correct an award. 7
A. Timing
A motion to modify or correct an award must be made within ninety days, or
the time specified by the state statute, after a copy of the award has been delivered
to the applicant. 48
In Richardson v. Harris,549 Harris and Richardson entered into a contract
where Richardson was to construct an office for Harris by November 22,
1986.5 0 Relations turned sour and a dispute between Harris and Richardson
over an alleged breach of contract was submitted to arbitration. " An award
was rendered in favor of Richardson. 5 On September 6, 1989, Harris wrote
a letter to the arbitrators requesting a clarification of the award.553 Richardson
filed a motion for confirmation of the arbitrator's award and conversion of the
award into a judgment on December 6, 1989.-" ' Thereafter, on December 27,
1989, Harris filed an opposition to Richardson's motion and requested that the

539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.

Id
603 A.2d 788 (Del. 1992).
Id at 789.
Id
Id
Id at 791.
Id
No. 12060, 1992 WL 29804, at *2 (Del.Ch. Feb. 13, 1992).
Id
U.A.A. § 13(a).
818 P.2d 1209 (Nev. 1991).
Id
Id
Id at 1210.
Id
Id
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district court correct or modify the award. 5" The court found Harris' motion
untimely. 55 6
Harris asserted that his motion was timely because under Nevada law, the
statute of limitations should have been tolled while he awaited the response to his
letter of clarification sent to the arbitrators. 5"

The court found that under

Nevada law, Harris had ninety days from receipt of the award notice, September
5, 1989, to file his motion to modify or correct the award. 5 Harris' request for
clarification from the arbitrators did not act as a motion to modify or correct the
award, nor did it toll the time period of ninety days from which to file. 55 9 Thus,
since Harris' motion was not filed until December 27, 1989, it was untimely. 560
DAN COuGHUN
LAURA KINTL

JOHN MOORE
MELISSA MORROW

555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.

Id
Id
Id
Id at 1211.
Id
Id
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